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CoThe superiority of market mechanisms in educational provision is a premise that has re-
ceived renewed emphasis under the regime of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The cen-
tral idea of PPPs—enthusiastically embraced by a range of international organizations,
development agencies and scholars—is grounded in the assumption that competition be-
tween public and private schools is an effective means of promoting education quality and
efﬁciency. PPP policy frameworks are expected to establish genuine market dynamics in
which suppliers innovate and boost the quality of their education services as a way to at-
tract families, who are portrayed as beneﬁt maximizers and well-informed consumers. The
application of these market ideas to education, however, has suffered from a series of
modiﬁcations and failures under real world conditions. This study is based on the case of
Chile—the most market-oriented education system in the world—and examines how few
of the taken-for-granted beneﬁts of market-oriented provision either have been or can
be fulﬁlled, due to the nature of the supply structure and to the effects of agents’ expecta-
tions and behaviors.Introduction
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education are portrayed as a cost-
effective policy solution to the access and quality problems that many educa-
tion systems, especially in developing countries, currently face (Patrinos et al.
2009; Chattopadhay and Nogueira 2013). The primary objective of PPPs is
to promote competition for resources between private and public schools as a
means for enhancing the quality and effectiveness of education systems. Schoolceived July 30, 2014; revised May 4, 2015, July 30, 2015, and September 2, 2015; accepted Sep-
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VERGER ET AL.choice is seen as a central mechanism to this end. As argued in the well-known
World Bank report The Role and Impact of PPPs in Education: “The idea is that
parents choose the best school for their children on the grounds of quality,
which in turn puts pressure on schools to compete to attract students and
to achieve better academic results at a lower cost” (Patrinos et al. 2009, 61).
According to this same report, providing people with choice and exit op-
portunities may especially beneﬁt “marginalized groups and the poor, who
are ill-served by traditionally delivered public services” (6).
Despite the recent application of this particular meaning of “PPPs” in the
education ﬁeld—that is, as a policy framework that triggers school choice and
competition—the speciﬁc policy instruments that countries are expected to
adopt in developing PPPs in education, such as vouchers or out-contracting
of services, are far from new. In fact, the concept of PPPs in education has
many resemblances to the public sector reform programme that public choice
theorists have been advocating for decades, as well as to what social scientists
have traditionally termed “quasi-markets” in education (see Glennerster 1991;
Le Grand 1991)
Existing research on quasi-markets, vouchers, and school competition
has not reached clear conclusions concerning the costs and beneﬁts of these
policies, although it usually raises education equity concerns (Waslander et al.
2010; OECD 2012). Despite full awareness of the evidence (or of its absence),
inﬂuential international organizations and transnational consultancy ﬁrms
are actively disseminating PPP solutions across a broad range of practice com-
munities (Verger 2012; Lubienski 2014). They see school competition within
PPP frameworks as a sort of magic bullet that, once governments have ad-
dressed the necessary regulatory issues, has the potential to promote access
and improve learning outcomes in very diverse educational settings.
The wide diffusion of PPP solutions in education that we are witnessing
today is related, to a great extent, to the material power of its promoters, as
well as to the power of the “market metaphor” in public sector reform. Mar-
ket metaphors are inherently persuasive due to their capacity to reduce the
complexity of educational problems and solutions to a few simple nostrums:
for example, schools competing for students and resources are key drivers
of educational change and excellence. Policy messages based on market meta-
phors are also powerful because most policy makers have long experience with
“the market” as a space for the distribution of a range of goods and services
in their daily lives. Despite the elegance and persuasiveness of the market
model, we argue that its application faces numerous obstacles in real edu-
cational settings.
Our main objective in this article is to explain how quasi-markets work
in the education sector and to assess the extent to which related policies in
fact generate new educational opportunities for the poor or, on the contrary,
exacerbate existing educational inequalities. To achieve this objective, we fo-224 May 2016
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ucation for the longest period and on the largest scale. Methodologically
speaking, we develop and apply a “realist evaluation” framework (see Pawson
2006) for assessing the worth of the policy. In fact, the ﬁrst part of the article
is devoted to presenting the core principles of a realist evaluation method-
ology and outlining the advantages of adopting such an approach as opposed
to more conventional evaluation methods. We argue that realist evaluation
is especially appropriate for analyzing education policies whose implemen-
tation depends so decisively on the strategic behavior, “logics of action” (see
Ball and Maroy 2009) and preferences of the intended beneﬁciaries of the
intervention—clearly the case for PPPs in education.
A key step in developing a realist evaluation lies in systematically articu-
lating the main theoretical assumptions on which the policy to be analyzed
is grounded—what Pawson (2006) calls its “program ontology.” To a great
extent, the theoretical roots of PPPs in education can be traced to public choice
theory, which is why we dedicate the second section of this article to identify-
ing the main premises in this theory and relating them to the core elements
in the design of PPPs in education.
In the third section, we present brieﬂy the main features of the Chilean
education system, especially those that more clearly ﬁt the PPP program on-
tology; and in the fourth, we present the methods and the empirical strategy
followed by the study that we conducted in Chile. In the ﬁfth section, we an-
alyze our data according to two of the most fundamental assumptions of PPP
models: ﬁrst, on the demand side, the assumption that information allows
choices based on quality criteria and that these choices are the key factor in
promoting school competition; and then, on the supply side, the premise that
school competition promotes educational quality and school diversiﬁcation
and innovation.
Finally, we conclude by discussing our results and identifying the main
policy lessons offered by a realist evaluation of the application of public choice
theory assumptions to Chilean education.A Realist Evaluation Framework for Analyzing Education Quasi-Markets
The analysis of the implementation and impact of PPPs—and quasi-market
policies, more broadly speaking—is a particularly contentious area of study.
Existing research on the subject is puzzling in the sense that the interpre-
tation of data often yields highly contradictory conclusions. The range of
methodological options most used in these studies is eminently quantitative,
varying from experiments with random samples and control groups to pro-
pensity score matching and regression discontinuity analysis (Patrinos et al.
2009). The dependent variable that predominates in this sort of study is stu-
dent learning, as measured by standardized testing. Some studies concludeComparative Education Review 225
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mann 2006; Chakrabarti and Peterson 2009), while others claim that there
are few effects or that the impact is minimal at best (Rouse and Barrow 2009).
Regarding other success criteria as cost-effectiveness, the literature is also re-
markably contradictory. Some researchers conclude that greater school com-
petition makes public schools more productive and efﬁcient (Hoxby 2000),
while others suggest that market mechanisms are a source of inefﬁciency in
education systems (Levin 1999).
One of the reasons why research on PPP yields such contradictory re-
sults lies in the context-sensitivity of these policies, as well as the difﬁculty of
capturing and controlling contextual variables within econometric models.
Impact analyses of PPPs frequently attempt to understand whether “PPPs
work (or not)” without paying sufﬁcient attention to contextual issues that
condition results, or simply by assuming that this type of variables can be
controlled or measured through different proxies. Recent developments in
policy evaluation studies can contribute, however, to challenging such a heavily
positivist tradition. This is the case with “realist evaluation,” a theory-driven
evaluation methodology that treats policy programs (in our case, PPPs) as hy-
potheses about social betterment that need to be unpacked and empirically
tested before we credit them with assumed impacts (Pawson 2006).
Realist evaluation is part of a “realist” social science tradition that under-
stands social systems as the product of “endless components and forces”
(Pawson 2006, 18). Researchers in this tradition recognize how challenging
it is to try to exercise control over the numerous macro- and microconditions
that inﬂuence the policy intervention we wish to analyze. However, by no
means does this imply that we should not try to capture how “contextmatters”
in policy processes—quite the reverse. As a methodology, realist evaluation
challenges us to stop assessing interventions in a vacuum and instead to put
ﬁrst importance on determining “what works, for whom, in what circum-
stances or respects . . . and how?” (Pawson and Tilley 2004, 2).
In both experimental and quasi-experimental impact evaluations it is
usually taken for granted that PPPs and other policy interventions are, per se,
treatment variables that necessarily alter educational results in one way
or another (see Glewwe 2014). Following the premises of realist evaluation,
our research takes a step back and problematizes the operations of PPP in-
terventions themselves, not just their putative results. This entails opening
up the black-box of the intervention to determine whether its constitutive
mechanisms are effectively triggered by the agents involved. Whether the
subjects actually go along with the theory behind the PPP intervention and
use the resources as intended by its designers becomes in effect an empiri-
cal question rather than a condition that is taken for granted. Thus, instead
of assuming that policy programs are automatically implemented as designed,
realist evaluators always see their application as mediated by the previous ex-226 May 2016
This content downloaded from 158.109.228.046 on January 19, 2017 09:50:39 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETperiences, values and interests of the subjects, and by the ways in which they
interpret the rules of the program (Ball et al. 2012). Inevitably, some aspects
of the policy interventions “will be rejected, selected out, ignored, [or] de-
liberately misunderstood,” and subjects’ responses may even look “frivolous”
to the authors and proponents of the intervention (Bowe et al. 1992, 22).
Of course the realist evaluation approach has itself been the subject of
criticism and is not without limitations (see Marchal et al. 2012; Porter 2015).
The framework nonetheless seems particularly relevant to the analysis of
policy interventions that are characterized by a complex set of agents and
variables in interaction. Faced with this challenge, realist evaluators tend to
consider two main sets of variables that are usually missing or poorly incor-
porated in econometric models: ﬁrst, the local conditions in which the in-
tervention is implemented (including the norms, regulations, and socioeco-
nomic conﬁguration in which the subjects are embedded); and, second, the
preferences, logics of action, and strategic responses of the educational agents
who take part in the intervention. Both of these factors indelibly inﬂuence
the enactment and the outcomes of an intervention. Therefore, as a ﬁrst
step, analyzing PPPs in a realist evaluation mode involves reconstructing the
“program ontology” of the intervention, which we undertake in the following
section.The Premises of Public Choice Theory in Education
The theoretical roots of PPP programs can be found in public choice the-
ory. This theory—sometimes referred to as social choice theory or market
theory (see Lubienski 2006)—is an integral part of the neoliberal approach
to public policy, particularly in its prescriptive diagnosis of the pathologies
of public administration (Klees 2008). Public choice theorists assume that
human beings are rational and self-interested utility-maximizers and, on the
basis of this core concept, construct the models that explain what they con-
sider to be governmental failure in service provision (Mueller 1979). In fact,
public choice theorists consider public institutions as inherently inefﬁcient
and incapable of effectively promoting social welfare because bureaucrats
do not have the right incentives to pursue public interestedness (Buchanan
and Tullock 1999).
On the basis of these assumptions, public choice theorists see market-
type institutional arrangements as the best alternative to “democratic con-
trol” (see Chubb and Moe 1990) and favor deregulation of government agen-
cies and their management as business-style enterprises in competition with
other providers. Yet although public choice theory assumes the superiority
of private institutions, advocates do not necessarily seek pure-market arrange-
ments. As Levin et al. (2013) remind us, even Milton Friedman recognized that
equity and social cohesion concerns may justify public funding and otherComparative Education Review 227
This content downloaded from 158.109.228.046 on January 19, 2017 09:50:39 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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premised on continued state funding to provide public goods because the
potential for free-riders in some sectors could otherwise lead to an under-
supply of socially desired goods such as education (Olson 1965).
The most well-known and inﬂuential transposition of public choice the-
ory into the education policy ﬁeld was authored long before the idea of
PPPs gained such centrality in the global education agenda. It is found in
Chubb and Moe’s Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools (1990). The starting
point of this book is the assertion that education systems are captive to inter-
est groups, especially teachers’ unions and administrators—groups that con-
trol public resources and reorient regulations in large part to satisfy their
own interests rather than those of students. They also assume that direct pub-
lic provision creates inherent institutional pathologies because bureaucra-
cies are isolated from competitive pressures and responsiveness to consumers.
In fact, they consider bureaucracy as the main obstacle to school effective-
ness, since it “imposes goals, structures, and requirements that tell principals
what to do and how to do it—denying them the discretion they need to exer-
cise their expertise and professional judgment, and denying them the ﬂexi-
bility they need to develop and operate as teams” (Chubb andMoe 1990, 187).
The solutions to these problems can be found, they maintain, in changes
at the school organization level and principally involve allowing schools more
autonomy and encouraging them to behave like private enterprises in a
market situation: “While schools controlled only by the market are free to
organize any way they want . . . an environment of competition and choice
gives them strong incentives to move toward the kinds of ‘effective-school’
organizations that academics and reformers would like to impose on pub-
lic schools. Of course, not all schools in the market will respond equally
well to these incentives. But those that falter will ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to
attract support, and they will tend to be weeded out in favor of schools that
are better organized” (Chubb and Moe 1990, 190).
For market advocates, more private participation in education provision—
and therefore less governmental provision—is virtuous in and of itself. Pri-
vate schools do better than government schools because they are better or-
ganized and managed and are more responsive to competition and enjoy
more autonomy to respond effectively to such competition in key areas,
including the management of the teaching workforce. Accordingly, some of
their key policy recommendations are to outsource the management of
public schools (as in the charter model) and to encourage public schools to
emulate the organizational culture of the private sector.
Yet freedom of school choice is probably the most central mechanism
in quasi-market designs for education. School choice, according to market
advocates, will contribute to breaking away from an excessively bureaucratic
education system by granting families more power and by making schools228 May 2016
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ers in market situations, parents are expected to seek optimal achievement
of their preferences by selecting the best school available, or by leaving a
school with which they are dissatisﬁed in order to select a better one—what
Chubb and Moe (1990) call “the power to switch.”
To attract and/or retain clients, schools will need to provide higher qual-
ity services to innovate and to respond more quickly than their competitors
to parents’ preferences. Competitive pressure should therefore result as well
in greater school diversiﬁcation (Chubb and Moe 1990). Milton Friedman
already predicted that, in a market-driven system, there will be “many more
choices, there will be a whole rash of new schools that will come into existence”
(1994, 101), while James Tooley considered that “product differentiation and
diversity are the hallmarks of the dynamics of competition” (1993, 37).
Despite the apparent simplicity of the “market model,” the relationship
between education markets and public intervention is itself far from sim-
ple. Somewhat paradoxically, deregulating the education sector turns out to
be insufﬁcient for constructing competitive educational markets. To imple-
ment an effective quasi-market and, speciﬁcally, to promote competition in
such a context, the state needs to intervene proactively—at least, in the areas
of educational ﬁnancing, evaluation and public information. Per capita ﬁ-
nancing policies via, for instance, voucher schemes are expected to guaran-
tee choice opportunities for poorer families and promote interschool com-
petition effectively. Evaluation and information policies are expected to
overcome the effects of imperfect consumer information, long recognized
as one of the principal obstacles to perfect competition to rule in most
markets (Lawson 2009). In education, standardized evaluation of students’
learning outcomes and the corresponding publication of the results (usually
in rankings or league tables) are the most well-established instruments for en-
suring widespread consumer information.
Figure 1 portrays themain causal mechanisms assumed by public choice
theorists to determine the operation of education quasi-markets. Each arrow
represents a supposed causal relationship between two processes. The pro-
cesses in square boxes are those that depend directly on state intervention,
whereas those included in circles depend on “market dynamics” (or supply and
demand interactions). As can be seen in the ﬁgure, information and vouchers
allow for parental choice—whether choice bears on the selection of preferred
schools or the decision to exit from poor-quality ones. Parental choice in turn
generates higher levels of school competition, which motivates increased in-
novation and institutional diversiﬁcation (widening choices opportunities for
consumer demand) and propels quality and efﬁciency increases in educa-
tional supply. Finally, evaluation mechanisms need to be in place to assess
the quality of those providers entering the market and, more importantly, to
measure schools’ performance on a regular basis. Performance evaluation canComparative Education Review 229
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VERGER ET AL.help nurture competitive systems of ﬁnancing and, at the same time, pro-
duce the information that parents need in order to make “correct” choices.
These are then the main variables in the program ontology of educational
PPPs and their corresponding causal links a presumed to induce a virtuous
circle.
The diagram reveals that, in the PPP program ontology, there are a sig-
niﬁcant number of assumptions and concatenated explanatory relationships
that need to be unpacked and questioned.
Market Mechanisms in the Chilean Education System
Conducting empirical research on the effects of education quasi-markets
is difﬁcult because it is uncommon to ﬁnd education systems in which mar-
ket rules have penetrated deeply. Generalizing from the various studies on
school vouchers is difﬁcult because they are often based on experiences that
have been implemented very locally, usually for a limited period and with dif-
ferent speciﬁc institutional designs. In fact, not every education quasi-market
is suitable for relevant analyses, since “it may take some time for school choice
policies to yield improvements in average academic achievement” (PatrinosFIG. 1.—The program ontology of PPPs in education. Adapted from Verger (2012).230 May 2016
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solutions because the different agents taking part in these complex inter-
ventions (e.g., principals, teachers, and families) need both practice and policy
continuity in order to understand market rules and incorporate them into
their educational decision-making behavior (Waslander et al. 2010). Chile is
quite an exceptional case in this respect. The conditions in the country swamp
such limitations because Chile has the longest-lasting, deepest, and broadest
experience with highly deregulated educational market mechanisms of any
country in the world. Those programs have been carried out on a national scale
for over three decades.
In Chile, the implementation of education market policies goes back to
the early eighties. The military junta that ruled the country from 1973 to 1990
under the command of the dictator Augusto Pinochet undertook major neo-
liberal reforms in the public sector. Education was one of the institutions
most deeply transformed during that period. The cornerstone of the educa-
tion reform was a drastic alteration of education ﬁnancing rules and pro-
cedures. A per capita funding system with a voucher scheme was introduced
as a way to ensure that educational ﬁnancing followed educational demand.
Choice was put at the center of educational policy. Resource allocation be-
came dependent on the capacity of schools to compete in attracting students
and—even more—on their actual attendance at schools.1 Since the intro-
duction of the voucher system, enrollment in private schools has increased
dramatically, a situation clearly illustrated in ﬁgure 2, which shows the evo-
lution of enrollment according to ownership at primary and secondary edu-
cation levels between 1981 and 2013.2 Over these three decades, enrollment
in private schools, particularly subsidized ones, increased dramatically and sur-
passed enrollment in public schools. In 1981, private school enrollment repre-
sented 22 percent of total enrollment, but by 2012 it was 61.2 percent, almost
three times as great.
In 1994, the government approved the Law of Shared Financing as a
complement to the voucher program. This regulation allows subsidized pri-
vate schools to charge families fees over and beyond the amount of the school
voucher provided by the government, though when the fees are high the
amount of the voucher is reduced. Since its approval, this additional fund-
ing system has been a bone of controversy. While supporters claim that these
extra fees provide sorely-needed additional funds to a system characterized
by a low level of spending per student, critics claim that they undermine the
school choice options of those poor families that cannot afford to pay the
extra fees (Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; Elacqua et al. 2013).1 Transfers of funds from the government to the schools are actually based on monthly atten-
dance, which is regularly supervised by inspection bodies.
2 Corporations are a very exceptional type of vocational education schools run by private com-
panies that receive state funding, but not through the voucher system.
Comparative Education Review 231
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practice in Chile, especially in the private education sector (Hsieh and Urquiola
2006; Contreras et al. 2007). However, recent legislation expressly bans selec-
tion practices for academic and socioeconomic reasons in preschool and pri-
mary education.3
Finally, another key element in the Chilean education system is the Sys-
tem of Quality Measurement in Education (SIMCE). This standardized na-
tional assessment of academic performance, which is administered to students
in three grades in primary education and three in secondary education in eight
areas of knowledge, is one of the main mechanisms designed to guide families’
school choice decisions. SIMCE results are published on a yearly basis, and
families can check the scores of each school and its ranking relative to others
in the same geographic area. SIMCE data are also expected to promote edu-
cational competition and efﬁciency by serving as a benchmark for the distribu-
tion of salary incentives among teachers and providing a basis for rewarding
the most productive (Mizala and Romaguera 2004).
Methods and Empirical Strategy
The realist evaluation approach adopted in this article is based on analyz-
ing the level of compliance of the most central causal links contained in the
PPPs in education program ontology—that is, the degree to which the causal
assumptions built into the intervention (see ﬁg. 1) prove actually to hold inFIG. 2.—Enrollment by school type (%), years 1981–2013. SOURCE.—Authors from the Chilean
Ministry of Education statistics.3 See the Ley General de Educación (Law 20370) passed in 2009.
232 May 2016
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the PPP dynamics in the Chilean education system. Since, like most realist
evaluations, we consider that quantitative strategies are necessary but insufﬁ-
cient to capture the full complexity of policy interventions, our research draws
on both quantitative and qualitative data.
The information analyzed derives from two different sources. On the one
hand, secondary quantitative data such as historical statistics and informa-
tion in the SIMCE-2011 database are used to examine the evolution of private
providers, families’ school selection criteria, and the enrollment requirements
that schools apply. On the other hand, the qualitative data of the study come
from a sample of 10 schools in a socially mixed neighborhood of the city of
Valparaíso where we carried out in-depth interviews with key stakeholders
between April and June 2013 to better understand the providers’ logics of
action and the roots of consumer behaviour. Two public schools, seven pri-
vate subsidized schools, and one fully private school composed the sample—a
distribution of providers types is very similar to the average distribution pre-
vailing in Chile and particularly representative of the school system in Val-
paraiso.4
In each of the selected schools we carried out in-depth interviews with
the principal and with two teachers, and semistructured interviews with
5–10 families with children in the ﬁrst grade of ISCED-1. Families and
teachers were selected randomly in each school of the sample. In total, we
interviewed 10 principals, 64 families, and 20 teachers. The interviews aimed
at capturing the different logics of action and strategies on both the demand
and the supply sides of the phenomenon. Results were analyzed using cat-
egories that had been identiﬁed through review of literature on quasi-markets
in education conducted prior to the ﬁeld study.
While this overall research design cannot provide exact assessments of
the causal linkages in ﬁgure 1 or a strictly representative portrait of the sit-
uation of schools and families in Valparaiso, let alone Chile as a whole, it can
serve as a critical “reality” check on the conceptual bases of PPPs in the
country and furnish new perspectives for critique of school choice and other
market policies in education.
Demystifying Market Assumptions in Chilean Education
This section analyzes the application of public choice theory assumptions
to education markets in the Chilean education system on the basis of the data
assembled. As mentioned, it is beyond the scope of the present article to test
all the implicit relations displayed in ﬁgure 1. We do, however, focus on the
most important of them, assessing the validity of the causal linkages involved.4 Valparaiso is one of the most populous cities in Chile, with around 300,000 inhabitants. In the
year 2013, the city had 112 primary schools, of which 39 percent were public, 53 percent private but
publicly subsidized, and 8 percent totally private.
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demand behavior and a second one more related to the supply side of the
relationship.
Demand Side: School Choice, Information, and Educational Quality
The ﬁrst group of assumptions that we need to unpack are those as-
serting that information allows choices based on quality criteria, and that
well-informed family choices are the main trigger of school competition. Ac-
cording to market theory in education, access to objective and transparent
information about the quality of the different providers are necessary for
consumers to make accurate decisions. A voucher system needs to promote
access to information on school quality to allow families to behave as com-
petent consumers. The purpose of the Chilean government in publishing the
SIMCE results is to make information on “the quality” of Chilean schools vis-
ible to all members of society but especially to students’ families—thereby
serving to democratize the educational planning process.
Market advocates tend to think of families as “beneﬁt maximizers” or as
educational actors whose decisions are guided exclusively by instrumental
rationality. However, international research on school choice demonstrates
that this is not always the case (Ball 2003; Hastings et al. 2006; Waslander
et al. 2010). For instance, family preferences tend to vary according to so-
cioeconomic status (SES): academic features and test scores are more valued
by families with higher SES. In contrast, families with lower SES are less re-
sponsive to changes in schools’ academic performance. Even in the Chilean
case, where a long-standing evaluation and information system is in place
and huge government campaigns have been undertaken to encourage fam-
ilies to use it, parental choices are based on multiple factors and manifest
“rationalities” that go well beyond SIMCE.5 In fact, data on choice criteria
in Chile itself support the thesis that SES frames decisively the variability of
family decisions on education (see ﬁg. 3).
Figure 3 shows that as family SES increases, distance-to-school becomes
a weaker constraint on choice. At the same time, values/religion and aca-
demic criteria are more important for families from higher SES. Only 7.1 per-
cent of families from the poorest quintile afﬁrm that academic excellence
and SIMCE results represent their top criterion of choice. By way of contrast,
this value is 24.1 percent in the case of families from the ﬁfth or highest SES
quintile.
Economists themselves have at times questioned the uncritical under-
standing of choice as an action uniquely guided by individual utility maxi-5 The index of socioeconomic status (SES) used in this analysis was constructed on the basis of
four variables included in the SIMCE database: level of family income, father’s education, mother’s edu-
cation, and number of books at home. The weight of each variable was calculated by using categorical
principal component analysis method.
234 May 2016
This content downloaded from 158.109.228.046 on January 19, 2017 09:50:39 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETmization (Berg 2003; Gauri and Vawda 2003). They acknowledge that choice
may change over time—what is technically called the “time-inconsistency
problem” in the structure of preferences (Berg 2003). They also acknowl-
edge that the supposed beneﬁts that public choice theory associates with
increasing choice possibilities (e.g., secured by vouchers) may face “principal-
agent problems” (Gauri and Vawda 2003).6 In this case, children and their
parents constitute the “principal” party, and schools represent the “agent.”
Though by their enrollment decisions families contract for school services
on the assumption (or hope) that the schools in question will treat maxi-
mizing children’s learning outcomes as their clear priority; in fact, schools
often have other interests and agendas that may be concealed from their
“clients” (Gauri and Vawda 2003). Economic theory identiﬁes “asymmetric
information” as the main factor underlying the principal-agent problem in
school choice: the agent may know distinctly more about the possible trans-
actions, trade-offs, and outcomes involved than the principal and so be much
better placed to give an appearance of compliance with the terms of the
agreement while in fact putting its own interests ﬁrst. The degree of asym-
metry, moreover, differs by with the SES of client families. While top quintile
SES families may be relatively ﬂuent in school data and procedures, lackFIG. 3.—First reason for school choice by SES quintiles. SOURCE.—Authors from SIMCE (2011).6 Principal-agent is a political science term for situations where one party (the “agent”) is engaged
to achieve the interests of another (the “principal”) but is often motivated to achieve its own interests
in the transaction and short-change the true stakeholder.
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VERGER ET AL.of information or difﬁculties in interpreting it correctly are the main bar-
riers experienced by the most disadvantaged families in making the “right
choices.” (Schneider et al. 2006).
However, in contrast with this deﬁcit theory interpretation of school
choice behavior, our research shows that families with different backgrounds
in fact value different school characteristics. These preferences are related
to their socioeconomic background but do not necessarily depend on their
level of familiarity with standard information sources such as the SIMCE.
Thus, in some cases, if the SIMCE is not used as a resource for choosing the
best option, it is because families are looking for other school attributes such
as discipline or religious values that are absent from the SIMCE database,
not because they are ignorant of it.236
All uRVIEWER: Did you check SIMCE results when you were looking for a school?INTEHER: No, I didn’t care about the SIMCE, actually. I really looked for secu
r my son, the type of teachers, and a space in which he could be comforta
ubsidized free private school)MOT rity
fo ble.
(SRVIEWER: What did you ﬁnd in this school when you were looking for an al
tive for your child?INTE ter-
naHER: I liked the teacher training, the structure of the school, its discipline,
ct that it is a religious school, because our family is also Catholic. I especially li
e training and the moral values given to schoolgirls. That’s what I liked about
hool and that’s why I came here. (Subsidized free private school)MOT the
fa ked
th this
scEven school managers are aware of the fact that the SIMCE may not
be the most crucial inﬂuence on school choice. A manager from a subsi-
dized private school whom we interviewed pointed out the paradoxical
coexistence, in the same year, of a drop in his school’s SIMCE results with
a signiﬁcant increase in demand: “The SIMCE is not the most important
thing that families look for. Actually, last year we went down in the SIMCE,
and we increased enrollment by 40 students” (principal, subsidized medium-
cost private school).
Instead of asymmetric information, what our interviews with Chilean
families principally reveal is the prevalence of a highly varied range of school
attributes valued by them. Families—including poor families—quite simply
value different school characteristics, whatever their level of knowledge of
the system. Among these preferences, school composition stands out since
many families are concerned to avoid their children having contact with
speciﬁc social groups (Saporito 2003). Schneider et al. (2006) found that,
during the school choice process, 87 percent of Chilean families only con-
sider schools with students whose socioeconomic characteristics are simi-May 2016
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REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETlar to their own. Our own data also show that a number of parents discard
schools for this same reason:Comparativ
All uRVIEWER: Is this the school you chose as your ﬁrst option? Did you ch
her schools?INTE eck
otER: No, I chose this one because. . . . There’s a school closer to my ho
t I don’t like it. It’s a municipal school, and I dislike the children that go th
ubsidized medium-cost private school)FATH me,
bu ere.
(SSchool size also has an inﬂuence on the schooling decisions of families.
Small schools tend, for example, to be associated with a warmer and friend-
lier atmosphere.RVIEWER: Is this the school you choose as your ﬁrst option?INTEHER: Yes, because it’s a small school and closer to my home. (Subsidized f
ivate school)MOT ree
prRVIEWER: Why did you choose this school?INTEHER: Because it’s a small school, with not many children. The quality is go
d I like it. The smaller the school, the more parents can know it, the m
ntact with teachers. We are like a family. (Subsidized free private school)MOT od
an ore
coOf course, the satisfaction of preferences may be limited by the na-
ture of education supply in the area in question (Thieme and Treviño 2013).
When this is the case, poor families must adjust their initial structure of
valued attributes to match the geographical particularities and limitations
of their local education market. The geographical constraints on choice in
Chile have been extensively examined by Elacqua (2012), who shows that
the majority of students in low-performing schools either have no better al-
ternatives close to their homes or are constrained in their mobility among
schools by selection processes and economic restrictions.
Other limitations on choice derive from the realities of family budgets:
some households simply cannot cover the fees that subsidized private schools
charge. The following interview reﬂects this idea clearly:RVIEWER: What type of schools did you check before this one?INTEHER: I saw some of them not very far from home; they are private schools.
ey were too expensive, and I can’t afford them.MOT But
thRVIEWER: And what about the other schools you checked? Did you exclude th
cause of the cost?INTE em
beHER: Yes. That was the only reason. (Subsidized free private school)MOTe Education Review 237
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VERGER ET AL.Overall, our data show that families’ preferences and choice criteria are
highly variable in real education settings. Different preference structures,
economic constraints and geographical limitations undermine competition
dynamics (or the “race for excellence”) among schools in education quasi-
markets. This implies, among other things, that schools can improve their
“market position” by responding to different families’ preferences without
having necessarily to improve their academic performance. In other words,
family choices do not necessarily impel improvements in school quality but
instead produce a range of different responses by schools to the shape of edu-
cational demand. We explore this topic further in the next section.
Supply Side: Competition, Educational Quality, and School Diversiﬁcation
To gain a better understanding of how education markets work, demand-
side analysis must be complemented by analysis of the behavior of educa-
tion providers. The theory of education markets posits that it is providers’
response in the competition to satisfy consumers’ demand that ensures the
highest level of market efﬁciency. There are two sides to this assumption: The
ﬁrst is encapsulated in the assertion that “school competition generates higher
levels of efﬁciency and quality”; the second concerns the assumed levels of
innovation and diversiﬁcation associated with higher levels of competition.
Before carefully scrutinizing these assumptions, we examine ﬁrst whether
and to what extent competition actually occurs. Under market theory one ex-
pects that numerous providers of the same service operating in the same ter-
ritory will guarantee vibrant competition. This should be the case in the Chil-
ean system, which is characterized, especially in urban areas, by massive
educational supply in terms of the number of schools. To take one repre-
sentative example, the small neighborhood in Valparaiso that we studied had
10 schools operating within very close proximity; four of them were within
500 meters of each other on the same street. This would seem like a very high
level of “objective competition” in the school market. To our surprise, how-
ever, school principals did not generally perceive this level of competition or
interpreted it as only involving schools very similar to their own in char-
acteristics and market position (see also Gewirtz et al. 1995). All the prin-
cipals we interviewed were completely aware of the prevailing market seg-
mentation in Chilean education, a phenomenon recently highlighted by a
number of studies.7 One principal offered, for example, the following com-
ment on competitive pressures: “I think that in geographic terms . . . in each
place there are one or two schools . . . We should have to steal students from
[Public School 02] and beyond . . . in that space. But to be honest there is
so much good word-of-mouth, because our student population comes by it-
self” (Principal, public school).7 See, e.g., Mizala and Torche (2012); Elacqua at al. (2013); Valenzuela et al. (2014); Zancajo et al.
(2014).
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REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETThe fact that perceived competition is far below what an outside observer
might assume to be its “objective” level has real implications for school dy-
namics. Segmentation in the market for educational services in fact op-
erates to limit competition (Fitz et al. 1997).
This does not mean that competition dynamics are entirely absent from
the Chilean education market—far from it. However, competition takes place
at very different levels of intensity, and in very different terms from those
predicted by public choice theory. Under public choice theory, we would
expect to observe what Van Zanten (2009, 86; based on the evidence pre-
sented by Gewirtz et al. 1995) denominates as “ﬁrst-order competition” in
student recruitment, which involves each provider attempting to secure the
highest number of students from the total pool in a local education market.
In real education markets, however, providers have stronger incentives to
go for “second-order competition” (Van Zanten 2009, 86), which refers to
efforts to recruit speciﬁc categories or strata of students—such as those who
are more academically able or have a positive attitude toward learning and
school norms.
Schools are aware of the fact that such attributes (both academic and
social) affect the circumstances in which they provide educational services
and so inevitably inﬂuence their academic results. Thus, in quasi-market
frameworks where students’ test results have a direct effect on market po-
sitioning, schools will tend to compete to attract those students who are
congruent enough with their particular ethos to help them build compar-
ative advantage. This is especially true in those cases, like the Chilean one,
where performance is linked to state ﬁnancial incentives for teachers. In
these situations, schools in fact select students more often than students/
families choose schools. Second-order competition is both promoted by seg-
mented education markets and contributes to reproducing school segmen-
tation and segregation (Elacqua 2012).
Table 1 shows how common student selection practices are in Chilean
schools. The data presented summarize the main enrollment requirements
in different categories of schools, as reported by parents and demonstrateTABLE 1
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT REQUIREMENTS AS REPORTED BY PARENTS
(% OF PARENTS RESPONDING TO EACH REQUIREMENT)Comparative Education Review
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Certiﬁcate of grades at the previous school 35.5 42.6 33.9
Certiﬁcate of baptism or religious marriage .6 13.7 31.1
Certiﬁcate of salaries 2.6 7.4 4.8
Interview with parents 16.8 40.3 79.8
Observation of students’ behavior in-class 1.6 7 33.1
The student must take a written exam or entrance test 8.5 45 58.8
Total number of observations (n) 80.153 106.960 15.222SOURCE.—Authors, from SIMCE (2011).239
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VERGER ET AL.that schools in fact apply a range of admission criteria that differ substan-
tially by type of school involved—despite the fact, mentioned above, that stu-
dent selection is illegal in Chilean primary education.
The student sorting and selection process can be understood as a short-
cut to quality. Schools do not compete as much by improving their edu-
cational services or raising their quality standards as much as they do by
screening their students on different sets of criteria. Recruitment practices,
along with expulsion patterns, turn out to be highly “strategic” phenomena
in many schools. As Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) demonstrate, student se-
lection processes are one of the main determinants of the higher academic
performance of private schools in Chile.
Overall, what competition generates is not straightforward incentives for
better quality but rather strategies for ﬁnding and attracting the students that
best match the proﬁle and competitive advantage of different categories of
schools. In this context, the fees that schools charge are more the result of
a deliberate strategy to segment the market than the result of a calculation
of the objective value of the services offered. In other words, price—in addi-
tion to selective admissions policies—can be used by schools to exclude un-
desired students and thereby increase the homogeneity and performance
of their enrollment.
Do Quasi-Markets Lead to Educational Diversiﬁcation and Innovation?
The second assumption on the supply side in educational markets is
related to the relationship between competition on the one hand and edu-
cation innovation and diversiﬁcation on the other. Market pressure is ex-
pected to make schools more innovative and diverse and, by doing so, to
generate a more varied supply of educational and curricular services. In other
words, by market premises, competitive pressure should produce horizontal
segmentation in the school market, understood as the production of a greater
number of pedagogical and/or curricular options (Lubienski 2006). This as-
sumption is largely contradicted, however, by the fact that, as just shown,
market rules tend to generate more vertical than horizontal segmentation
and the former tends either to alter or to prevent the latter. This effect was
already noted in the 1994 OECD publication, School: A Matter of Choice, which
concluded that “Demand pressures alone are rarely enough on their own to
create . . . diversity. . . . Under a uniform model of schooling, choice is more
likely to reinforce educational hierarchies” (OECD 1994, 80).
Vertical segmentation, or “hierarchization,” is based ﬁrst and foremost
on student enrollment and the composition of schools. Once this type of
segmentation has occurred and the position of the schools in the hierarchy
has been well established, there are fewer chances for schools to innovate and
fewer incentives for them to respond to new clients’ demands. When this type
of segmentation prevails, schools often end up deﬁning and rationalizing240 May 2016
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REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETtheir educational strategy and model as a function of the market niches that
remain available to them, or as a reaction to their immediate socioeconomic
context. Overall, a school’s room for manoeuvre is especially limited when
its reputation is heavily anchored in the local space (see Van Zanten 2009).
As the principal of a free public school remarked to us: “We have improved
a little, but it’s hard because there are many factors that have to be con-
sidered, such as student attendance, children who are absent for nonaca-
demic reasons, such as the mother being asleep. . . . These are moms who
are not very committed to education.”
In evident contradiction to the predictions of public choice theory, pri-
vate schools are not necessarily the main drivers of innovation. On the
contrary, according to Lubienski (2006, 333), “Where educational inno-
vations are occurring, they are often the result of bureaucratic or public-
policy interventions, not market forces.” On the basis of the theory of mo-
nopolistic competition, this author argues that diversiﬁcation is one of the
strategies developed by educational providers to reduce the level of com-
petition to which they are exposed—not to increase it. Moreover, the strat-
egy is frequently based on symbolic innovations (in marketing, branding and
other image domains) rather than on substantive pedagogical and/or cur-
ricular changes. Schools that are successful enjoy some degree of monopoly
control (Lubienski 2006). In Chile, it is quite common for schools to change
their traditional Spanish-language name for an English one or to adorn them-
selves with symbols—such as distinctive uniforms—that are associated with
elite schools (Espinola 1993).
In the Valparaiso neighborhood that we analyzed, there are a few
schools that highlight their “curricular project”—usually schools with alter-
native pedagogies—and consider it as a key element of their success. How-
ever, it is also true that curricular innovation may work as an indirect way of
screening for motivated families, whether they are from the highly-educated
middle class or the highly aspirational segments of the lower class. The line
between pedagogical innovation and marketing may at times be very thin.
In fact, symbolic distinction strategies are frequently used by schools to im-
prove their market position and to attract new demand. For example, the
principal of a private school in our sample admitted that he uses selection
tests, not because he needs them (in fact, his school had weak enrollment)
but as a way to burnish the school’s image:Comparativ
All uINTERVIEWER: Are you interested in a particular student proﬁle?CIPAL: The most important thing is that they have a clear vision of what t
nt to achieve. That’s enough for me. . . . However, I think that next year
e going to introduce selection tests. Why? Families to some extent. . . .
rculates by word of mouth, and they would say “not everyone can go to
hool, you need something else. . . . ” You see? It is a bit like marketing? (Priv
hool)PRIN hey
wa we
ar this
ci this
sc ate
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VERGER ET AL.The reasoning of this Chilean principal is more than anecdotal. As Ball
(1993, 7) notes in relation to the British quasi-market model, schools “are
also using the option of exclusion more readily in order both to rid them-
selves of ‘difﬁcult’ students and to demonstrate to potential clients that
discipline and safety are taken very seriously.” And, he adds, “Selection is,
and will increasingly become, a ‘selling point’: what you get is who you go
with.”
Why, though, would market rules promote educational standardiza-
tion? Different mechanisms can be identiﬁed here. The ﬁrst reason for stan-
dardization to occur in quasi-market frameworks is that many of the schools
that aim to become competitive attempt to emulate institution that provide
a highly traditional education. Thus, they tend to offer a traditional academic
curriculum giving access to higher education, which they know is the top
priority of most families (Adnett and Davies 2000).
Second, the external exams that are supposed to promote competition
end up standardizing educational services and promoting curricular con-
formity. External evaluations and the resulting rankings therefore have the
potential to undermine efforts to promote a more diverse and differenti-
ated curricula and so to create situations where “schools look . . . more and
more like each other” (Levin 1997, 259). In Chile, the pressure generated
by external evaluation policies is undoubtedly having this effect. In all the
schools analyzed, “teaching to the test” is strongly embedded in the orga-
nizational culture and curricular priorities of the institution. Every week,
numerous class hours are dedicated to training students to become skilled
test-takers (some schools even have a subject called “SIMCE”); the best
teachers are assigned to teach subjects evaluated by the SIMCE, and a sig-
niﬁcant portion of the school budget is allocated to hiring consultancy ﬁrms
that provide SIMCE simulations. Teaching to the test is an expanding prac-
tice in Chile, which does not mean that the pressure that the SIMCE gen-
erates sits comfortably with the teachers.242When I was offered the fourth grade, they automatically gave me the SIMCE, and I
was not ready to work on the SIMCE. In fact, I don’t agree with the SIMCE. . . .
but we are part of the system and we have to do it. (Interview teacher 01, Subsidized
private school A)
It is very stressful to work on a course with the SIMCE because there are many
goals to achieve, many demands. We are subordinated to the results when giving
this type of course. Personally, I don’t like working with SIMCE groups; you’re con-
stantly struggling, and they expect results. (Interview teacher 02, Subsidized pri-
vate school B)Third, educational markets produce an additional paradox that limits
diversiﬁcation: In competitive frameworks, schools that are experiencing ex-
cess demand and/or those that are performing well in rankings should haveMay 2016
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REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETthe resources to fund innovation, but conversely little incentive to do so (be-
cause they are already doing well playing by the existing rules of the game).
At the same time, those schools that should bemore willing—and have greater
need—to innovate, do not have the resources to do so due to insufﬁcient
demand. These same resource-poor schools also have the kinds of pupils who
take less well to experiments with innovative pedagogies, and their more in-
novatory staff tend therefore to quit in favor of better-resourced or more
prestigious institutions (Adnett and Davies 2000). In the Chilean case, the
fact that schools are legally authorized to charge higher fees—and that more
successful schools often do this—further increases the fragmentation effect.
Finally, competition among schools faces additional constraints that are
due to the nature of the educational ﬁeld itself and that make it even less
likely that the practice will lead to diversiﬁcation and continuous innovation.
As Adnett (2004) notes, some of these limitations stem from the uncertainty
surrounding which speciﬁc modes of teaching and learning are most effec-
tive or from the difﬁculty of transferring successful experiences from one con-
text to another. An innovation that may be successful with one set of teach-
ers and pupils may not be successful with another set that does not possess
the same characteristics—a caveat that becomes more obvious in highly seg-
mented education systems like the Chilean one.
Conclusion: Things Left Unsaid in Educational Quasi-Markets
Our study focused on the Chilean education system as a paradigmatic
case of the application of market mechanisms to educational supply. Our
research approach, inspired by the practice of realist evaluation, may be par-
ticularly useful in demystifying public choice theory predictions about the
superiority of market mechanisms in education. By taking actors’ behaviors
and responses not as given or solely guided by instrumental rationality, a realist
evaluation perspective opens the space to observe other motivations, rational-
ities, and translation processes that govern the way in which subjects react
to information and incentives within education quasi-markets.
Our research echoes ﬁndings from other scholars about the Chilean case
(e.g., Hsieh and Urquiola 2006; Mizala and Torche 2012; Elacqua at al. 2013)
and, like them, demonstrates that arguments for the superiority of quasi-
market mechanisms are far from irrefutable. However, our goal in this ar-
ticle has not been to “measure” the exact effects of quasi-markets in edu-
cation but rather to analyze how market mechanisms work in real situations
and how a number of factors, usually absent from discussion of public choice
theory, alter relevant aspects in educational actors’ behaviour, including de-
cisions about school choice, exit, price-setting, and selection.
When observing market mechanisms operating in real educational set-
tings, the most relevant research question is not whether these mechanisms
do or do not work, but whether and under what circumstances market rulesComparative Education Review 243
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ditioned by a large number of factors that can affect and can even counteract
the rules deﬁned by the market; and choice is a good case in point. As our
work demonstrates, after more than 30 years of persistent pro-school choice
policies in Chile, family decisions are neither irrefutably based on “objective
information” nor automatically responsive to traditional indicators of school
quality.
The fact that market rules are neither enforced nor “obeyed” in the ways
their advocates assume does not cancel their effect or make them harmless.
They do alter the educational landscape, although in ways that are different
from the predictions of public choice theory and the expected responses
of education agents. As the Chilean case clearly indicates, actors’ strategies,
“logics of action” and responses to incentives do not take form in a vacuum,
but are rather born in social and institutional settings strongly shaped by
market rules.
One of the most obvious effects of the application of market mechanisms
to education is the vertical segmentation of supply and the resulting aca-
demic and social segregation. What market rules mostly do is shape agents’
responses in a way that increases social and academic differentiation within
the system. Providers have large incentives to compete for the best students
and to exclude those who can adversely affect their results and reputation.
On the demand side, a large number of families look for their “social seg-
ment” in the education market, in most cases to avoid schools where the
poorest are enrolled. However, as the Chilean case shows, not all families
are in a position to escape what Chubb and Moe (1990) call the “schools that
falter” due to ﬁnancial, geographical or social constraints. The well-stocked
and highly diversiﬁed education market conceived in quasi-market ideology
just does not exist for everyone, due to the numerous impediments to choice
and the incentives that schools experience for getting rid of the academically
weakest students. These students end up enrolling in schools—usually public
ones—whose performance then suffers but that do not close down as a con-
sequence, precisely because the process facilitates the concentration of un-
derachievers.
The effects of these dynamics on social justice and inequality of oppor-
tunities are multiple and devastating. There is a negative peer effect as a re-
sult of school segregation, which is seldom mentioned by market advocates.
For every potentially good student that is able to “escape” a bad school and
to enroll with high-performing peers, there is a loss of that student in a school
that remains full of low performers. For market advocates, these exit dynam-
ics represent a zero-sum game—that is, a process where the losses experi-
enced by some are fully compensated by the beneﬁts experienced by oth-
ers. However, the peer-effect losses that these dynamics generate destroy that
balance and have the potential to undermine the aggregate quality of the244 May 2016
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REALIST EVALUATION OF THE CHILEAN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETeducation system as well as the educational opportunities of those students
that are not able to “escape.”
Finally, the recent history of the Chilean education system serves as a
template for testing the economic theory of second-best markets in educa-
tion, which suggests that “when features of particular sectors preclude pure-
market arrangements, attempts to impose more market-like models may lead
to less-optimal and even perverse outcomes—with no a priori way of know-
ing the likely effects” (Lubienski 2006, 334). Clear evidence of market fail-
ure in the Chilean education system—a system now characterized by high
inequality and few signiﬁcant improvements in overall performance—has com-
pelled the Chilean state to develop policies for correcting market imper-
fections and creating external incentives for schools to compete and become
more efﬁcient. These policies include new systems of performance-based
teacher salary supplements, new information dissemination programs to en-
sure that families get full information on the SIMCE results, and—signiﬁ-
cantly—the introduction of an extra voucher system for schools enrolling vul-
nerable students.8
As a consequence, Chile—one of the purest market systems in educa-
tion—is gradually being transformed into a second-best education market.
It is of course too early to assess how these new measures will affect the sys-
tem’s equity and effectiveness. However, a realist evaluation perspective sug-
gests that optimal results can hardly be expected because second-best options
do not alter the importance and the weight of other factors shaping actors’
responses. Lubienski’s (2006) examples of unexpected mechanisms asso-
ciated with this new generation of incentives can clearly be applied to the
Chilean case. Schools can be invited to become even more selective, but in-
novation will hardly occur in a system that becomes even more oriented to-
ward “teaching to the test.” Providers’ tactical moves may once again alter the
effect of new policies and contradict what market rules would predict for
system performance improvement. The most convinced market advocates
may still attribute the erratic functioning of the Chilean public-private part-
nership to the (increasing) intervention of the state. To them, the roots of
socially and historically situated educational problems seem always to be re-
lated to too much state and too little market.
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